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"[W]e are a country of immigrants. We are a country that has been
tremendously benefited by bringing the people to the United States
who want to work hard, people to the United States who believe in
the kind offree environment that we have here." ~Condoleezza Rice'
I. INTRODUCTION
Division of Immigration Health Services ("DIHS") policy
restricts immigrant detainee medical care to emergency care and
conditions that would cause deterioration of detainee's health or
uncontrolled suffering affecting his or her deportation status. 2 As a
result of this policy, the medical staffs of private detention centers
throughout the United States are providing sub-standard and in some
cases reckless medical care, and often push off paying for any
medical care until it is either too late for immigrant detainees to seek
care or it results in lifelong physical deformities.3 The unfortunate
story of Francisco Castaneda is just one of many examples.
Starting in March of 2006, immigrant detainee Francisco
Castaneda persistently sought treatment for a bleeding, suppurating
penile lesion and physician's assistants and three outside specialists
repeatedly advised that he urgently needed a biopsy.4  In April,
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") physicians
* Kate Bowles is a second year student at Pepperdine University School of Law
and she is next year's Editor-in-Chief of NAALJ. Kate graduated from the
University of Pennsylvania with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing, and she decided
to pursue a law degree in order to have a broader impact in the healthcare field.
"I am grateful to my husband Eric for pushing me to be a better person - we make
a great team! I thank my parents Mike and Maribeth for supporting my ambitions,
and my parents-in-law Dave and Kathy for their kindness."
1. Condoleezza Rice, Former Secretary of State (2005-2009), Interview with
Maria Bartiromo of CNBC Television (May 22, 2008), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/05/1051 84.htm.
2. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 26, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct. 1845 (2010) (No. 08-1529)
[hereinafter ACLU Briefj.
3. Id. at 21-24, 26 (describing several examples of utter failure to provide
detainees with constitutionally adequate healthcare). See infra Section V-B.
4. Hui v. Castaneda, _ U.S. _, 130 Sup. Ct. 1845, 1849 (2010); Castaneda v.
United States, 538 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Amended
Compl. 372; Doyle Decl. Ex. 1).
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assistants at the San Diego Correctional Facility ("SDCF") noted that
penile cancer should be ruled out, so a Treatment Authorization
Request ("TAR") was filed with the DIHS, requesting approval for
biopsy and circumcision.5  DIHS determined that certain possible
infections were not causing the lesions and approved biopsy, urology
consult, and pertinent surgical follow-up. 6
Pursuant to the TAR, in June ICE sent Castaneda for an oncology
consult, whereby an oncologist John Wilkinson, M.D. ("Dr.
Wilkinson") agreed that Castaneda had either penile cancer or a
progressive viral based lesion, and Dr. Wilkinson strongly
recommended urgent urologic assessment of biopsy and definitive
treatment.7 He offered inpatient consultation and biopsy, but instead
Castaneda's physicians decided to pursue outpatient biopsy, which is
more cost effective.8  That same day Dr. Wilkinson spoke with
Public Health Service ("PHS") employee Esther Hui, M.D. ("Dr.
Hui") who verbalized understanding of the need for a biopsy and
who explained to Dr. Wilkinson that DIHS would not admit
Castaneda to a hospital because it considered biopsy to be an elective
outpatient procedure, so Dr. Hui never made arrangements for the
biopsy.9
A few days later, Castaneda filed a grievance asking for the
surgery recommended by Dr. Wilkinson, claiming he had a
considerable amount of pain and was in desperate need of medical
attention.'o This grievance was denied, and by the end of the month,
there was still no biopsy, despite DIHS records indicating that the
lesion was getting worse with more swelling, foul odor, difficulty
urinating, and bleeding from the foreskin." The agency claimed he
5. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1281. Castaneda was detained
at the SDCF and therefore could not seek outside medical care. Hui v. Castaneda,
130 Sup. Ct. at 1848. The TAR noted that the lesion had grown and had a fowl
odor and Castaneda had rated his pain an 8 out of 10. Castaneda v. United States,
538 F.Supp.2d at 1281.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1281-82.
8. Id. at 1282. Dr. Esther Hui, a PHS employee, was the physician responsible
for Castaneda's medical care during his detention at SDCF. Hui v. Castaneda, 130
Sup. Ct. at 1849.
9. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1282.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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did not have cancer at this time and he needed to be patient and
wait.12
Dr. Hui continued to deny the request for a total of eleven
months.' 3 During this time, ICE told Castaneda that while a surgical
procedure might be recommended long-term, that does not imply that
the Federal Government is obligated to provide surgery if the
condition is not threatening to life, limb or eyesight.14 Every few
days from August to February of the next year, ICE continued to
claim that surgery would be elective despite a continued worsening
of symptoms and the appearance of another lesion.' 5
After the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") began
advocating for Castaneda, a TAR was approved and there was a
fourth urology consult with Asghar Askari, M.D. who recommended
biopsy for a penile lesion that was most likely cancer, but just a few
days prior to Castaneda's scheduled biopsy, he was abruptly
released.' 6 He then went to the emergency room of Harbor-UCLA in
Los Angeles, where he was diagnosed with squamous cell carcinoma
and his penis was amputated, with the record confirming that he had
metastatic cancer." He underwent chemotherapy treatment, which
was unsuccessful and in February of 2008 he died.'
After Castaneda passed away, his sister Yanira and his minor
daughter Vanessa were substituted as plaintiffs in his pending
lawsuit.19 Castaneda had asserted claims against (1) the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), (2) Bivens
claims against federal officials alleging Fifth and Eighth Amendment
violations for deliberate indifference to his serious health needs, (3)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law malpractice claims against state
12. Id.
13. Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct. at 1849.
14. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1283.
15. Id. at 1284. These statements were made despite the fact that two more
outside physicians had recommended biopsy of Castaneda's lesion. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1285.
18. Id.
19. Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct. at 1849.
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officials and (4) a malpractice claim against Dr. Hui who was
responsible for Castaneda while in ICE custody. 20
Dr. Hui crossed an ethical line by failing to put her patient's
serious medical needs before policy considerations.21 However, even
if Dr. Hui is reprimanded, punished or replaced, there will still be
instances of patient neglect by immigrant detainee healthcare
providers.22 The problem is not with Dr. Hui in particular, but rather
with the immigrant detention system policies and practices. The
DIHS policy in question restricts medical care to emergency care and
conditions that would cause deterioration of detainee's health or
uncontrolled suffering affecting his or her deportation status.23 Thus,
detainees should be kept minimally healthy, but only enough to be
deported or otherwise released. 24 This DIHS policy arguably restricts
medical diagnosis and treatment in a way that is unconstitutional on
its face.25 Furthermore, PHS employees that run the immigrant
detainee system now have all of the benefits of sovereign immunity
with none of the accountability required of other similarly situated
employees serving in state prison systems, the Bureau of Prisons, and
20. Brief for Respondents at 14, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct. 1845 (2010)
(No. 08-1529). The Fifth Amendment states "No person shall be...deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The
Eighth Amendment asserts "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII.
21. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 25. Dr. Hui and others repeatedly blamed
their failure to properly treat Castaneda on a DIHS policy against paying for
"elective" care, even though the Supreme Court has held that Bivens constitutional
claims are intended to deter Government officers from violating the Constitution
'no matter that they.. .are acting pursuant to an entity's policy."' Id. (citing
Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)). "[T]o the extent that
DIHS policy encourages constitutional violations, the threat of Bivens lawsuits
against individual officials is necessary to create pressure for reform from within
DIHS, as well as to spur appropriate Government officials to address the matter."
Id.
22. See infra Section V.
23. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 26.
24. Id.
25. Id. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (finding that prison
officials may be held liable under Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate
humane conditions of confinement if the official knows of and disregards an excess
risk to inmate health or safety).
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the DIHS.26 This structure encourages systematic recklessness and
negligence, 27 which is especially disheartening in the medical
profession where people's lives are at stake.
Spurred by troubling media reports on immigrant detainee deaths,
in 2009 Congress held hearings on the treatment of detainees and the
healthcare services provided to individuals held in its custody at
detention centers around the country, and U.S. Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") reports were requested concerning
compliance with ICE's Medical Care Standards. 28  The hearings
detail shortcomings such as the failure to provide medication for
mental illness and other serious medical conditions, dispensing of
improper drugs that triggered severe adverse reactions, and
inadequate screenings that failed to detect advanced stages of
pregnancy, kidney stones, suicidal tendencies, and infectious
diseases. 29 Legislation has been introduced in the House and Senate
to reform the laws governing immigration detention and increase
oversight and enforceability of detention standards. 30  Last year,
physician advocates suggested that Congress adopt the Refugee
Protections Act, which would reduce the number of needlessly
26. Brief of National Experts on Health Services for Detained Persons as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct.
1845 (2010) (No. 08-1529) [hereinafter National Health Experts Brief]. Doctors
serving state prison systems, the Bureau of Prisons, and DIHS are still subject to
Bivens claims for violations of the Constitution, even though they provide
indistinguishable services from PHS physicians like Dr. Hui. Id.
27. See generally ACLU Brief, supra note 2.
28. Brief of National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 18, No. 08-1529 (January 22, 2010).
29. Id. at 18-19. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-401T,
Organizational Structure, Spending, and Staffing for the Health Care Provided to
Immigration Detainees, Before H Subcomm. on Homeland Security 1 (Mar. 3,
2009) (Statement of Alicia P. Cackley, Dir. of Health Care),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09401t.pdf; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-869T, Alien Detention Standards: Observations on the
Adherence of ICE's Medical Standards in Detention Facilities, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary 1, 83-99, 143-46, 161-204 (June 4, 2008) (Statement of
Richard M. Stana, Dir. of Homeland Security and Justice Issues),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08869t.pdf [hereinafter June 4, 2008 Hearing].
30. William Fisher, ICE Ignores Health of Immigration Detainees, THE
PUBLIC RECORD (Dec. 21, 2010), http://pubrecord.org/nation/8671/ignores-health-
immigration-detainees/ [hereinafter The Public Record Report].
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detained immigrations, legally entitle detainees to have their basic
health needs met, and strictly limit coercive measures such as forced
psychotropic medication and use of shackles and restraints to cases of
necessity. 3 1 However, the bill has been in committee since May
2010.32
Current news reports continue to expose the derisory state of
immigrant detainee medical care.3 3 At the SDCF, where Castaneda
was placed, the Public Record reports that there are detainees with
untreated clinical depression, bipolar disorder, type two diabetes,
hypertension, abscessed and broken teeth, severe chest pain and
cancer like-pain.34 A recently settled ACLU lawsuit stated in its
Complaint that detainees at the SDCF were routinely subjected to
long delays before treatment, denied necessary medication for
chronic illness, and refused essential referrals by medical staff,
leading to unnecessary suffering and death.35 Care was described as
grossly deficient, causing detainees great physical pain and mental
anguish and amounting to punishment in violation the ban on cruel
and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.36
One possible solution would be to allow a constitutional
("Bivens") action against federally employed personnel, including
the PHS, for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
detained persons, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on
31. Erin Hustings and David Reid, MD, For the Health of Immigrants: Pass
the Refugee Protection Act (April 2, 2010), http://phrblog.org/blog/2010/04/02/for-
the-health-of-immigrants-pass-the-refugee-protection-act/.
32. S. 3113: REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT OF 2010, 111th Congress 2009-10,
Introduced and Referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary Mar. 19, 2010,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 11-3113 (last visited February 22,
2011). Although hearings were held in the S. Comm. on the Judiciary May 19,
2010, no action was taken afterwards. Id.
33. See infra Section V-B.
34. The Public Record Report, supra note 30.
35. Id. After two years fighting an ACLU lawsuit (filed June 2007)
challenging medical care policies at the SDCF and ICE's denial of needed
treatment, which has led to severe suffering and death among detainees, ICE has
settled with the ACLU by agreeing to change its policy on medical care that led to
the denial of "non-emergency" care including heart surgeries and cancer biopsies
and ICE promises to provide detainees with constitutionally adequate levels of
medical and mental health care. Id.
3 6. Id.
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cruel and unusual punishment." Considering that adequate medical
treatment was readily available, forcing Castaneda to suffer for a year
with untreated metastatic penile cancer likely met that standard and
thus constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, a Bivens
action would not undermine PHS's ability to execute its mission and
would not place even a minor hardship on PHS personnel.38 Amici
insist that the small risk of constitutional lawsuits does not materially
affect the willingness of medical personnel to provide such services,
as tens of thousands of other dedicated medical personnel have
provided high quality care to detainees for decades while being
employed by federal, state and local agencies that do not enjoy the
special immunity being sought by Dr. Hui.39 The vast majority of
PHS employees are dedicated public servants who have nothing to
fear from the stringent requirements of proving Bivens actions.40
Despite this enthusiastic support for Bivens actions, the United
States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") overruled Castaneda's
Bivens claims against Dr. Hui, holding that the Public Health Service
Act 42 USC § 233(a) ("PHSA") precludes Bivens actions against
PHS personnel for constitutional violations arising out of their
official duties.4' In order to understand how the Supreme Court
unanimously arrived at such a decision, Part II of this Comment will
discuss the background and interplay of the FTCA, the Westfall Act,
and the PHSA, and Part III will explore the reasoning behind
Castaneda's claims with reference to the history and development of
the Bivens cause of action. Parts IV and V will focus on the Legal
and Societal Implications of the Supreme Court's decision, and Part
VI concludes by suggesting another possible solution for immigrant
detainee system reform.
37. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (establishing deliberate indifference
to the serious medical needs of those detained as the standard for constitutional
violations); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(establishing the Bivens constitutional claim against individual government
employees).
38. National Health Experts Brief, supra note 26, at 18.
39. Id. at 18-19.
40. Brief of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Rep. Zoe Lofgren, and Rep. Jerrold Nadler
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 31, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct.
1845 (2010) (No. 08-1529) [hereinafter Representatives Brief].
41. Brief for Respondents, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct. 1845 (2010) (No.
08-1529).
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II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND INTERPLAY
A. Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA (28 U.S.C. § 1346) was enacted in 1946 in order to
provide a remedy for persons injured by wrongful acts or omissions
of the federal government, but it contains numerous exceptions,
exclusions, and pre-filing requirements that frequently bar such
claims.4 2 Furthermore, it creates an administrative procedure, which
resolves without litigation, the vast majority of tort claims against the
federal government.43 Judge Rosenn of the Third Circuit described it
as "a traversable bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity," as
the FTCA is the exclusive vehicle for tort suits against the United
States, its agencies, and for common law torts of federal employees
acting within the scope of their employment."
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, the Supreme Court
decided that § 1346(b) grants federal district courts jurisdiction over
a certain category of claims that are (1) against the United States, (2)
for money damages, (3) for injury or loss of property, personal injury
or death, (4) caused by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government, (5) while acting within the scope of his
employment, (6) under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.45
42. Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Diferent
Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 1105, 1105, 1109 (2009). Its
primary purpose was to abolish the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
and to end the outdated principle that "the king can do no wrong." Statement by
Rep. Way Owens Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Law and Governmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 24 (April 14, 1988).
43. Id. At 1106-07.
44. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1979). The doctrine of
sovereign immunity provides that a sovereign state may only be sued to the extent
that it has consented to be sued, and that such consent may only be given by the
legislative branch. Figley, supra note 42, at 1107. Since the Supreme Court held
that Dr. Hui is protected by the sovereign immunity of the FTCA, the only redress
Castaneda's family could now receive would be Congressional action.
45. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994).
Claims not included under § 1346(b) are excluded from the FTCA's waiver of
sovereign immunity. Figley, supra note 42, at 1110.
177Spring 2011 Is the Doctor In?
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B. Westfall Act - Congress Amends the FTCA in 1988
Westfall v. Erwin involved a negligence suit brought by Erwin
who received chemical bums while working as a civilian employee at
an Army depot.4 6  Erwin claimed that his supervisors, including
Westfall, had improperly and negligently stored toxic soda ash at a
warehouse and failed to warn Erwin, which resulted in him being
injured.47 Although Erwin filed the case in Alabama state court,
Westfall removed to federal district court and moved for summary
judgment based on absolute immunity, and since the acts were within
the scope of Westfall's official duties, the district court granted the
motion.48  However, the appeals court reversed because Westfall
failed to show that the negligent act was discretionary in addition to
being within the scope of employment.49  The Supreme Court
affirmed unanimously, and Justice Marshall wrote that granting
absolute immunity was proper only where government employees
were exercising more than a minimal amount of discretion.o The
Supreme Court also called for Congress "to provide guidance for the
complex and often highly empirical inquiry into whether absolute
immunity is warranted in a particular context."
In response to this request, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2679
("Westfall Act") in 1988, amending the FTCA to cover all federal
employees and providing under subsection (b)(1) that remedy against
the United States under 1346(b) and 2672 of this title is exclusive of
any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of
the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim, regardless of when the act or omission
occurred.5 2 According to subsection (b)(2), subsection (b)(1) does
not apply to a civil action against an employee of the government (A)
46. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 293 (1988).
47. Id. at 294.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 298.
51. Id. at 300.
52. Derrick R. Franck & Charles D. Beckenhauer, Personal Liability of
Federal Managers for Common Law and Constitutional Torts, 35 Air Force L.
Rev. 375, 376 (1991). See 28 U.S.C.A § 2679 ("Westfall Act" or "Federal
Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act") (West 2006).
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which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States or (B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the
United States under which such action is otherwise authorized.53
Thus, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for common law tort claims
against any employee of the government unless one of the two
exceptions applies.54
C. Public Health Service Act - Congress Extends the
FTCA to PHS Employees in 1970
The PHSA 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) was a 1970 amendment to the
PHSA (originally enacted in 1944) and it provides that a suit against
the United States is the exclusive civil remedy for negligent acts or
omissions of certain federally supported healthcare entities and their
officers, governing board members, employees and contractors in
performing activities related to medical, surgical, and dental care or
53. Id. The exception for constitutional claims is for Bivens suits discussed in
Section 1II. The statutory language of the Westfall Act § 2679(b) states:
(b)(1) The remedy against the United States provided by
sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding
for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against
the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or
against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action or
proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the
same subject matter against the employee or the employee's
estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission
occurred.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action
against an employee of the Government--
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of
the United States, or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the
United States under which such action against an individual is
otherwise authorized. Westfall Act 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(b)
(West 2006).
54. Id.
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other related functions.55  Covered entities and individuals are
considered employees of the federal government PHS and are
provided tort immunity from malpractice claims of negligence while
acting within the scope of their office or employment under §
233(a). While those covered are immune from suit for medical
negligence, the United States assumes liability to the extent set forth
by the provisions of the PHSA and the FTCA.57
At the time the PHSA was enacted, the payment of medical
malpractice insurance costs far exceeded the amount of claims paid
by federally funded migrant health centers, community health
centers, and health centers serving homeless individuals." Congress
in passing the PHSA hoped to free up resources for the provision
additional healthcare services. 59 Congress also sought to strengthen
the accountability of these centers by encouraging them to check staff
credentials by reviewing claims history and license status of their
physicians and other licensed healthcare practitioners.60
55. Public Health Service Act ("PHSA" or "Defense of Certain Malpractice
and Negligence Suits") 42 U.S.C.A § 233(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). The
statutory language claims:
The remedy against the United States provided by section
1346(b) and 2672 of Title 28, or by alternative benefits provided
by the United States where the availability of such benefits
precludes a remedy under section 1346(b) of Title 28, for
damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from the
performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions,
including the conduct of clinical studies or investigation, by any
commissioned officer or employee of the Public Health Service
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall
be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of
the same subject-matter against the officer or employee (or his
estate) whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. Id.
5 6. Id.
57. Id. PHSA § 233(a) contains explicit incorporation of the FTCA. Id.
58. Joseph P. Griffith, Jr., Medical Malpractice Litigation and Federally
Funded Health Centers: A Primer on the Federally Supported Health Centers
Assistance Act, 14-JAN S.C. LAW 32, 34 (2003).
59. Id.
60. Id.
31-1
D. Statutory Interplay
Castaneda's claims were against the United States as well as Dr.
Hui, a private employee of the SDCF who was acting within the
scope of her employment by providing medical care to immigrant
detainees.6' Sovereign immunity was extended to Dr. Hui by the
PHSA, as the SDCF is a federally supported healthcare entity, and
thus she was considered an employee of the PHS.62 While Dr. Hui
clearly is protected by the FTCA § 1346(b) for any tort caused by
medical negligence, the statutory law governing Castaneda's Bivens
constitutional claim against Dr. Hui is not as elucidating. 63 Although
the PHSA § 233(a), incorporates the FTCA, it does not mention the
Westfall Act § 2679(l)(b), and it also does not expressly exclude
constitutional claims, despite the numerous amendments that have
been made to it, since the Westfall Act was passed.' In fact, all of
the amendments to § 233(a) occurred after the Supreme Court upheld
Bivens claims in three cases and after the enactment of the Westfall
Act, meaning that if Congress' intent was to preclude Bivens claims
with the PHSA, it certainly had ample opportunities to do so.65
Section 233(a) does mention that it is "exclusive of any other
civil action," which according to the Supreme Court is broad enough
to accommodate both known and unknown causes action, and is not
undermined by the fact that the § 233(a) preceded the Bivens cause of
61. See Hui v. Castaneda, 120 Sup. Ct. at 1849 (for the premise that Hui is the
PHS employee who was responsible for providing care to immigrant detainees,
including Castaneda).
62. See supra Section I-C.
63. Brief for Respondants at 16, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 Sup. Ct. 1845 (2010)
(No. 08-1529). See infra Section III for a more comprehensive discussion on the
viability of the Bivens constitutional claim.
64. PHSA § 233(a).
65. Id. The cases span from 1971 to 1980 and the Bivens cause of action was
explicitly preserved by Congress in 1988. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Westfall
Act § 2679(b)(1) - (2) (enacted in 1988). Meanwhile, the PHSA has been amended
11 times, between 1992 and 2010, but none of these changes involve preclusion or
even limitation of the right to sue individual federal employees for constitutional
violations. PHSA 42 U.S.C.A. § 233(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (amendments
listed in Statutory Notes section).
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action. 66  The Supreme Court pointed out that the most recently
enacted of the FTCA (1946), PHSA (1944 with §233(a) added in
1970), and Westfall Act (1988) is the latter, and it essentially copied
§ 233(a)'s exclusivity language. 67  The Supreme Court also
acknowledged that the Westfall Act has an explicit exception for
constitutional violations, which according to the Supreme Court is
"powerful evidence that Congress did not understand the exclusivity
provided by § 2679(1)(b) or the substantially similar § 233(a)."68
One would think that prior to claiming Congress "did not
understand" the exclusivity of the PHSA when it passed the Westfall
Act § 2679(1)(b), the Supreme Court would at least look to
Congress' intent in passing an Act plainly supporting the
preservation of Bivens claims. The timing of the statutes alone
indicates a need to carefully consider whether one statute truly
precludes another. Based on the fact that the FTCA was passed in
1946 and § 233(a) was created as an amendment in 1970, whereas
the Westfall Act was enacted in 1988, perhaps the intent of a more
modem Congress was to allow an individual cause of action against
federal employees who violatethe Constitution. The Westfall Act
may have been a reaction to the increasing breadth of constitutional
rights granted to detainees and prisoners by the Supreme Court in the
1970s and 1980s,69 or it may have been Congress' explicit intent to
broaden the FTCA, in line with the prisoners' reform movement,
which started in the 1960s. 70 Either way, claiming Congress was
66. Hui v. Castaneda, 120 Sup. Ct. at 1851. The Supreme Court is likely
referring to both past and future causes of action not yet realized, such as a the
Bivens claim, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in case law and preserved
by Congress in the Westfall Act after the PHSA was enacted.
67. Hui v. Castaneda, 120 Sup. Ct. at 1851.
68. Id.
69. See infra Section III.
70. James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-
80, 2 CRIME & JusT. 429, 433 (1980) asserts:
Until the 1960s, the federal judiciary adhered to a 'hands
off attitude toward prison cases.. .A prisoner who complained
about arbitrary, corrupt, brutal, or illegal treatment did so at his
peril.. .The precondition for the emergence of a prisoners' rights
movement in the United States was the recognition by the
federal courts that prisoners are persons with cognizable
constitutional rights. Just by opening a forum in which
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simply confused when it expressly preserved a constitutional cause of
action, as well as other causes of action under federal statutes, is
disconcerting.
The duty of the courts when interpreting a statute is to look first
to the plain language of the statute, construing the provision of the
entire law, including its object and policy, and not to be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence in ascertaining Congress'
intent, and if the language of the statute is unclear the courts look to
its legislative history.71 Therefore, the Supreme Court should not
have based its analysis of § 233(a) solely on the fact that it is
"exclusive of any other civil action."72 Courts may also find it
necessary to trace a statute back to other statutes it references, to see
if those statutes have been amended, as is the case here, where the
Ninth Circuit traced the reference in § 233(a) "subject to the
provisions of chapter 171 of this title" back to the FTCA, which
incorporates by reference 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (the Westfall Act).73
Furthermore, courts have recognized exceptions to clearly delineated
statutes are implied when essential to prevent absurd results or
consequences obviously at variance with the policy of enactment as a
whole.74 As a result, courts may look to the legislative history to
ensure that the result was the one intended by Congress. 75
Both the plain meaning and the legislative history of the Westfall
Act reveal that Bivens constitutional actions against federal
employees should survive as a separate cause of action.76 On its face
the statute says the exclusiveness of the FTCA does not apply to
prisoners' grievances could be heard, the federal courts
destroyed the custodians' absolute power and the prisoners'
isolation from the larger society. Id.
71. Nw. Res. Def. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996)
(tracing back to U.S. v. Boisdore's Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850)).
72. Hui v. Castaneda, 120 Sup. Ct. at 1851.
73. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1288-89.
74. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979)).
75. See Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d at 1189.
76. Westfall Act § 2679(b)(2)(A)-(B); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on
H.R. 4358, H.R. 3872, and H.R. 3083 Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claim
Act, Serial No. 55, at 3-6 (April 14, 1988).
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either constitutional torts or separate causes of action against the
Untied States that are authorized by federal statute. The legislative
history reveals that the purpose of the Westfall Act was to extend the
provisions of the FTCA to all federal employees, not just PHS
employees or other groups with specific statutory protections, as
common law tort immunity was eroding.78 Congress made it clear
that this immunity was intended only to cover routine torts and that a
plaintiff whose constitutional rights had been violated remained free
to pursue a Bivens claim against the individual federal employee in
question. 79 In fact, Congress upheld the exception for constitutional
claims in the face of opposition by both the Department of Justice
and the American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO)
who argued that the phrase "including constitutional claims" should
be inserted in subsection (b)(1).8 0
Furthermore, a House Committee Report states that the second
major feature of Section 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(A)) is
that the exclusiveness of an FTCA remedy does not apply to
constitutional torts, since courts have drawn a sharp distinction
between common law torts and constitutional torts.8 1 While common
law torts are routine acts or omissions occurring in the usual course
of business, a constitutional tort is a vehicle to redress violations of
one or more fundamental rights embraced in the Constitution, which
is a more serious intrusion on the rights of an individual and merits
special attention. 82
77. Westfall Act § 2679(b)(2)(A)-(B).
78. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 4358, H.R. 3872, and H.R.
3083 Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claim Act, Serial No. 55, at 3-6,
(April 14, 1988) (setting forth the statutory language of H.R. 4358 Federal
Employees Liability and Tort Compensation Act of 1988).
79. Id. at 78 (Statement of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice Civil Division).
80. Id. at 78-79, 173 (Statement of Robert L. Willmore and Statement of Mark
D. Roth, General Counsel of the American Federation of Government Employees
(AFL-CIO)).
81. Report to Accompany H.R. 4612, Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988, H. Comm. on the Judiciary H.R. Rep. 100-700, at
6 (June 14, 1988). See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5947.
82. Id.
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Even the legislative history of § 233(a) reveals that Congress
intended to immunize PHS employees from garden-variety
malpractice claims, but not from constitutional violations.83 Section
233(a) was not part of the original PHSA, but was introduced during
congressional debate in the House on December 18, 1970 by
Representative Staggers, who claimed that this provision was needed
to protect PHS doctors, with their low salaries, from the burden of
taking out malpractice insurance to cover them from mistakes made
in the ordinary course of business.84 Thus, the concern was over
affordability of insurance for unintentional malpractice, which in no
way indicates an attempt to preclude intentional torts rising to the
level of a constitutional violation.8 ' After being approved, the only
mention of this amendment in the Senate occurred three days later,
when Senator Javitz expressed his support for the provision for
defense of certain malpractice and negligence suits against PHS
doctors. 86 In addition, the title "Defense of Certain Malpractice and
Negligence Suits" further indicates that Congress did not mean to
apply this section to any and all claims arising against PHS
employees in the past or the future." Therefore, Castaneda's Bivens
claims should not have been precluded by § 233(a), and in the next
Section, these issues are examined in the context of developing case
law.
III. OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Common Law Development ofBivens Claims
The case law demonstrates an expansion and then retraction of
the right to seek justice against an individual government official for
violations of the Constitution. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971), agency officials
83. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1293.
84. 91 CONG. REc. 42,542-43 (1970).
85. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1293.
86. 91 CONG. REc. 42,977 (1970).
87. 91 CONG. REC. 42,542 (1970); Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d
at 1293. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-
29 (1947) (for the premise that the title of a statute and the hearing of a section may
be used for interpretative purposes to shed light on an ambiguous word or phrase).
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unlawfully entered and searched Bivens' apartment and arrested him
for alleged narcotic violations, despite a lack of warrant or probable
cause.88 Bivens' complaint claimed that humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental suffering was caused by the agents' unlawful conduct in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Bivens sought relief in the
form of $15,000 in damages from each individual agent.8 9 Although
the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and the appeals court affirmed, the
Supreme Court reversed, indicating that courts should adjust
remedies as necessary to afford plaintiffs relief for invasions of a
federally protected right.90 The Supreme Court argued that its cases
have long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment
applies only to private persons' conduct that would be condemned
under state law, and therefore, the government officials' argument
that the Constitution is not an independent limitation upon the
exercise of federal power must be rejected.9' Furthermore, the
interests protected by state laws regulating trespass and the invasion
of privacy could be inconsistent or even hostile when compared to
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 92 In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except
for the protection of the judiciary, for rights which have been invaded
by officers of the government who are professing to act in its name. 93
Since historically damages have been regarded as the proper remedy
for invasion of personal liberty interests and there are no special
factors counseling hesitation or affirmative action by Congress, the
88. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. See Derrick R. Franck & Charles D.
Beckenhauer, supra note 52, at 381; William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations
Concerning Tort Liability of Government and its Employees for Torts and
Constitutional Torts, ADMIN. L.J. AM. UNIV. 1105, 1129 (1996).
89. Derrick R. Franck & Charles D. Beckenhauer, supra note 52, at 390. In
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Supreme Court reserved the question of
whether a constitutional violation by a federal agent acting under the color of his
authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages, but in Bivens, they held that it
does. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
90. Id. at 392 (citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 684; Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United
States, 289 U.S. 28, 36 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433
(1922) (Holmes, J.)).
91. Id. at 392-94.
92. Id. at 394.
93. Id. at 394-95.
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Supreme Court held that Bivens was entitled to recover money
damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the agents' violation of
the Fourth Amendment.94 The Supreme Court refused to address the
agents' argument that they were immune from liability because of
their official position.95
Justice Harlan's concurrence in the judgment described how he
initially believed the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the
complaint, but he then found that the federal courts do have the
power to award damages for violation of a constitutionally protected
right, even though the law is "not entirely free of ambiguity."96 In
response to the contention that the federal courts do not have the
power to accord damages for a constitutional violation absent
Congressional action, he did not understand why the Government and
the dissenting Justices maintained that recovery depends on whether
there exists such a remedy in the state in which the claimant
resides. 97 According to Justice Harlan, "[s]uch a position would be
incompatible with the presumed availability of federal equitable
relief."98 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins made clear that in a non-
diversity suit a federal court's power to grant equitable relief depends
on the presence of a substantive right derived from federal law, and
in this case the Fourth Amendment is a federally protected interest.99
In Davis v. Passman (1979), the Supreme Court established the
concept that the constitutional rights of a citizen presumptively
prevail over competing interests in the context of private damage
claims brought against public officials in their individual
capacities.o In this case, Davis alleged that her employer Passman,
94. Id. at 395-97.
95. Id. at 397-98.
96. Id. at 399-400.
97. Id. at 399-400.
98. Id. at 400. A proper showing must be made in terms of the ordinary
principles governing equitable remedies. Id. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 684.
99. Id. (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Al Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v.
Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1968).
100. Davis, 442 U.S. at 241-46. "No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.
All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it." Id. at 246 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 220 (1882)).
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a former United States Congressman, had discriminated against her
on the basis of sex in violation of her due process rights guaranteed
under the Fifth Amendment, and the Supreme Court held that an
injured party could bring a Bivens claim for damages, as justifiable
constitutional rights shall be enforced through the courts. 0 1
Then, Marie Green brought an action (in Carlson v. Green
(1980)) on behalf of her deceased son who she claimed died as a
result of personal injuries sustained by federal prison officials, in
violation of her son's due process, equal protection, and Eighth
Amendment rights.' 02 Despite the fact that Green's allegations could
also have supported a FTCA suit against the United States, the
Supreme Court extended Bivens to violations of an individual's right
to freedom from infliction of cruel and unusual punishment and
created a federal rule of survivorship for a Bivens-type claim.103 The
Supreme Court did not rely on the express FTCA language
preserving Bivens remedies, because that language was not added to
the FTCA until the Westfall Act of 1988, a full eight years after
Carlson, which indicates Congress' express codification of its
holding. 104
The Supreme Court in Carlson noted that a Bivens action may be
defeated in two situations: (1) when defendants demonstrate special
factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress, or (2) when defendants show that Congress has provided
an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute
for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
101. Id. at 231, 234, 241-42.
If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
Constitution by the declaration of rights. Id. at 241-42 (citing 1
Annals of Cong. 439 (1789).
102. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
103. Id. at 17-25.
104. Kratzke, supra note 88, at 1131-32.
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effective, noting that neither situation existed in this case."o' There
were no special factors counseling hesitation, as federal prison
officials do not enjoy such independent status in the constitutional
scheme to suggest that judicially created remedies against them
might be inappropriate.106 With regard to an alternative remedy, not
only is there no explicit congressional declaration that persons
injured by federal officers' constitutional violations may not recover
damages, but several factors suggest that a Bivens remedy is more
effective than an FTCA remedy. 0 7 First of all, the Bivens remedy in
addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose, since
responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the
public finances but also for the Government's integrity.' 08 Second,
Supreme Court decisions indicate that punitive damages may be
awarded in a Bivens suit, especially since "the 'constitutional design'
would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the
same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional
transgression."' 09 Third, a plaintiff cannot opt for trial by jury in an
FTCA action, but may do so in a Bivens suit, and last, an action
under FTCA exists only if the State in which the alleged misconduct
occurred would permit such a cause of action to go forward." 0 Thus,
the FTCA is not an adequate protector of a citizen's constitutional
rights.''
More recently, the Second Circuit ruled in Cuoco v. Moritsugu
(2000) (directly on point to Castaneda, though not mandatory
authority) that a pretrial detainee Cuoco, while she might have a
claim against the United States under the FTCA, could not bring a
claim against Federal Corrections Institution officials for an Eighth
Amendment violation by way of deliberate indifference to her serious
medical needs.1 2 As members of the PHS acting within the scope of
their employment, these employees enjoy the privilege of absolute
105. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. These two factors will be referred to as the
Carlson two part test.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id. at 19-21.
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 21-22 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
110. Id. at 22-23.
111. Id. at 23.
112. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2000).
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immunity to suits under the terms of the PHSA § 233(a), and this Act
is not limited to medical malpractice claims as when Congress has
sought to limit the immunity of these claims it typically provides an
express preservation." 3  This opinion stopped its analysis at the
FTCA and did not make an attempt to trace the statute back to its
amendments." 4
B. Section 1983 Claims
Even though the Supreme Court in Castaneda has foreclosed
upon a federal remedy for violations of the Constitution, there exists
a remedy against state government officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which applied in Estelle v. Gamble, a case strikingly similar to
Castaneda, where a prisoner was ordered by the prison doctor to
return to work despite persistent back pain and inadequate medical
treatment.115  The Supreme Court in Estelle held an Eighth
Amendment violation for inadequate medical care requires deliberate
indifference to a detainee's serious medical needs, which may
manifest itself though intentional denial or delay of medical care or
an intentional interference with the treatment once prescribed."16
Neither an accident, inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care, or negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition is
cognizable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment, though each may
constitute medical malpractice."' The Supreme Court reasoned that
the government has an obligation to provide medical care for those
113. Id. at 106-09. The Second Circuit gives only one example of a statute
with limiting language, which is 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1) providing an exclusive
remedy for damages for personal injury... arising from malpractice or negligence
of a medical care employee of the Veterans Health Administration. Id. at 108.
However, the language of the statute contains no express preservation of the FTCA
§ 2680 exceptions or express preservation of any other FTCA exception like the
Westfall Act, it merely says that the exception under FTCA § 2680(h) does not
apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7316(a)(1) (West 2010).
114. Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 107 (Statutory Discussion is Section (C)(1) of the
opinion).
115. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99-101, 105-06; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2010) (Providing a remedy against state employees who subject any citizen
to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws...") [hereinafter § 1983].
116. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
117. Id.
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whom it is punishing by incarceration, as an inmate is relying on
prison authorities for treatment of his medical needs."' If the
authorities fail to provide for these needs, they will not be met, and in
the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical torture
or a lingering death." 9
Meanwhile, more modem cases like DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services ("DSS") (1989) illustrate the
Supreme Court's intent to reduce the scope of the constitutional
violations cause of action. In this case, Joshua DeShaney and his
mother claimed under § 1983 that Child Protective Services violated
the Due Process Clause by failing to remove Joshua from his
physically abusive father, which occurred over a two year span and
resulted to beatings so severe that four-year-old Joshua fell into a
life-threatening coma and would have to spend the rest of his life
confined to an institution for the profoundly disabled.120  The
Supreme Court held that while the Due Process Clause guarantees
that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, this protection extends only to
unwarranted government interference.121 Even though the DSS was
involved with Joshua's case for over two years, he had no right to
protection from private violence and an affirmative duty to protect
him from child abuse did not arise and could not be enforced as a
violation of the Constitution.122
C. Discussion of Constitutional Claims
Section 1983 was enacted to ensure that State employees would
uphold the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has said that Estelle
and Youngberg stand for the proposition that "when the State takes a
person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
118.Id. at 103.
119. Id. (internal citation omitted).
120. Deshaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191-93
(1989).
121. Id. at 196.
122. Id. at 194-97.
191Spring 2011 Is the Doctor In?
192 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
responsibility for his safety and general well-being."' 23 In addition,
the Supreme Court has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to prevent the government from abusing its power or
employing it as an instrument of oppression, so even if § 1983 did
not exist the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment would still be applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause.124
In its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court does not mention a State Government specifically, but rather
uses the term in general way, and one would think that this
constitutional protection should apply to all people detained by any
government, whether federal, state, or local. Given that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides for equal protection under the laws,
it would make sense for federal employees to be subject to the same
standards as their State counterparts. Traditionally, the Federal
Constitution has provided a minimum standard, meaning that State
Governments do not have the power to reduce a person's
constitutional rights below this threshold. Should not the Federal
Government be held to its own minimum threshold? Should not this
duty to uphold the Constitution also be enforceable against federal
employees, even in the absence of an express statutory provision?
Arguably, the Supreme Court does not need one, as its own precedent
throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson
established that there is a cause of action against individual federal
employees for constitutional violations.
123. Id. at 199-200. The rationale for this principle is simple enough:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care
for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic
human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on state
action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 200.
See Youngberg v. Romero, 457, U.S. 307, 317, 324 (1982) (holding
that constitutional protections extend to those institutionalized for a
mental disorder as they are wholly dependent on the State for certain
services such as food, clothing, shelter and medical care).
124. Id. at 196-99.
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In raising such questions, one might wonder where the line
should be drawn if the Supreme Court is to allow Bivens actions. I
argue that instead of precluding Bivens actions, the Supreme Court
should have drawn the line at DeShaney, where the person
perpetrating the violence is in no way affiliated with the Local, State,
or Federal Government. Although the Supreme Court's claim in
DeShaney that the government has no constitutional duty to protect
citizens' life, liberty and property from private violence'25 is
disturbing on the basis that criminal laws were created to protect
citizens from such violence, it is clear that such violence was not
perpetuated by the government, and therefore was not actionable
against it.
One might also retort with an argument that the FTCA or some
other provision often provides an alternative remedy, which
substitutes the Federal Government as a defendant in actions where
federal employees have committed constitutional violations. But, as
the Supreme Court argued in Carlson, this remedy was not intended
by Congress to be an adequate substitute, as nothing in the FTCA or
its legislative history shows that Congress meant to preempt Bivens
claims or to create an equally effective remedy, and therefore it fails
to satisfy the minimum threshold set forth in the Constitution. 126
D. Analysis ofBivens in the Context of Castaneda
The Ninth Circuit found that the plain language of § 233(a)
allowed Castaneda to assert Bivens claims against individual PHS
Defendants, because Congress has not provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and which could be viewed as equally
effective (Carlson two part test). 127  According to Respondent's
Brief, far from evincing the explicit intent required by Carlson to
preclude Bivens claims, § 233(a) unambiguously states the opposite
based on its reference to chapter 171 of the FTCA, which
incorporates the Westfall Act.128
125. Id. at 196.
126. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-23.
127. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1286.
128. Id. at 1289-90.
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Yet the Supreme Court dismissed Dr. Hui from the case after she
brought a motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which argued
that she was absolutely immune from suit as a PHS employee acting
within the scope of her employment and that Castaneda must bring
his claim as an FTCA action against the United States only.129
Although the Supreme Court's brief opinion (8 pages) was based
solely on a short phrase from § 233(a),130 a more comprehensive
opinion discussing the common law Bivens claims was likely in
order, especially considering the common law context in which
Bivens claims arose. 13 1
With regard to Castaneda's case, the FTCA would clearly be an
inadequate remedy, since the Defendants' own record presented a
strong case for punitive damages, especially considering that Dr. Hui
refused Castaneda's request for a biopsy despite her knowledge that
several medical specialists suspected he had cancer and strongly
recommended it.132 Dr. Hui may even have lied about the medical
advice, as she indicated in an official report that Dr. Wilkinson
considered biopsy and circumcision to be elective, based on the fact
that he referred to it as "an elective outpatient procedure" when he
called Dr. Hui to advise immediate diagnosis and treatment. 133 The
evidence suggested that the federal government would not provide
for elective surgery, so Dr. Hui may have purposefully
mischaracterized the surgery in order to refuse him care, using such
circular logic that because he does not need a biopsy, he does not
have cancer at this time, and because he does not have cancer he does
not need a biopsy.134 Arguably such conduct was cruel and unusual
and may by itself be enough of a factual basis to indicate reckless
129. Id.
130. See Hui v. Castaneda, 120 Sup. Ct. at 1851 (for the phrase from § 233(a)
claiming it is "exclusive of any other civil action").
131. Bivens claims were created by the Supreme Court itself and Carlson
upheld a Bivens claim against a PHS employee after § 233(a) was enacted.
132. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1296.
133. Id. at 1297. While on the phone, Dr. Wilkinson was worried that the
lesion "may represent a penile cancer" and "required urgent urologic assessment of
biopsy" because "even benign lesions" in that area may be deadly. Id. Dr. Hui
changed Dr. Wilkinson's use of elective to describe the location of procedure into
her version, which was that diagnosis and treatment were altogether optional.
134. Id. at 1297-98 (citing Plaintiffs Ex. 8).
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disregard of Castaneda's serious medical needs in accordance with
the standard set forth in Estelle.'35
Furthermore, the Central District of California explained that the
FTCA fails to satisfy the Carlson test of providing an equally
effective alternative remedy, because it allows a lawsuit only if the
state in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause
of action for the same claim.' 36 Given that California caps non-
economic damages in medical malpractice actions at $250,000 and
Bivens actions have no cap, Castaneda would have a strong argument
that this amount is inadequate to compensate for his ten months of
pain, bleeding, anxiety, loss of sleep, and humiliation while in ICE's
custody, in addition to the subsequent amputation of his penis, almost
a year of grueling chemotherapy, and his eventual death.137
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the lack of federal common
law requires any right of action in federal court be granted either by
the Constitution or by federal statute,' 38 and arguably, here, there is
both a constitutional cause of action under the Eighth Amendment, as
well as a Congressional mandate to allow Bivens claims in
accordance with the Westfall Act.
In effectively eliminating the availability of Bivens claims against
PHS officers, the Supreme Court has resolved a Circuit Split
regarding the preclusionary impact of § 233(a). Dr. Hui's case relied
heavily on Cuoco, which held that the plain language of § 233(a)
precluded Bivens actions. 139 However, in the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
the Second Circuit must have failed to follow the statutory trail back
to the Westfall Act; otherwise Cuoco would have adhered to the
statutory mandate preserving Bivens claims.140 When reviewing the
present case, the Ninth Circuit respectfully requested that the Second
Circuit and other Circuits following Cuoco reconsider their
135. Id. at 1298.
136. Id. at 1287.
137. Id. at 1296-97.
138. Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
139. Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 108.
140. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1290-91.
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holdings.14' Unfortunately, in its opinion the Supreme Court did not
acknowledge the Westfall Act's incorporation by reference in §
233(a), and it is unclear why it found such an analysis
unnecessary.142
The Bivens claim was supported by Supreme Court as recently as
1991 in United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 (1991), which is
directly contradictory to the holding here.14 3  Smith dealt with the
Gonzales Act § 1089(a) defense of certain suits arising out of
medical malpractice, and this Act has a medical malpractice
provision worded almost identically to § 233(a).144  Both statutes
141. Id. at 1291. The Ninth Circuit also upheld Bivens claims against federal
secret service agents in Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995)
(basing its decision on the Westfall Act exception to the FTCA). Id. at 1289.
About twenty published and unpublished cases are listed in the Central District of
California Court's opinion as holdings that should be reconsidered, and these cases
appear to be from the 1st, 2d, 3d, or 7th Circuits. Id. at 1291.
142. See Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (per curiam opinion written
by Sotomayor, J.)
143. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1290.
144. The Gonzales Act 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) reads as follows:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections
1346(b) and 2672 of title 28 for damages for personal injury,
including death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, or
paramedical or other supporting personnel (including medical
and dental technicians, nursing assistants, and therapists) of the
armed forces, the National Guard while engaged in training or
duty... the Department of Defense, the Armed Forces Retirement
Home, or the Central Intelligence Agency in the performance of
medical, dental, or related health care functions (including
clinical studies and investigations) while acting within the scope
of his duties or employment therein or therefore shall hereafter
be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of
the same subject matter against such physician, dentist, nurse,
pharmacist, or paramedical or other supporting personnel (or the
estate of such person) whose act or omission gave rise to such
action or proceeding. This subsection shall also apply if the
physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, or paramedical or other
supporting personnel (or the estate of such person) involved is
serving under a personal services contract entered into under
section 1091 of this title. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(a) (West 2010).
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address damages claims for personal injury from certain federal
officials involved in medical, dental or related health functions, both
provide for exclusive civil actions and both incorporate by reference
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2671.145 Thus, the only notable difference is
that Smith held in favor of preserving Bivens claims.
Amici by the National Experts on Health Services for Detained
Persons claimed that the legal impact of allowing a Bivens claim
would have been minimal, as it would not have required the Supreme
Court to recognize any new constitutional right, merely to uphold the
standard set forth in Carlson.146 Dr. Hui argued that the facts here
arose in a different context because they dealt with immigration
detention and not prison as in Estelle, but Carlson itself involved an
action against a PHS defendant and the Supreme Court still upheld a
Bivens action against any federal employee who was responsible for
the medical care of detained persons.14 7 The location of detention is
irrelevant, as neither a prisoner nor an immigrant detainee is free to
leave and pursue medical attention. 4 8 Castaneda was completely
reliant on authorities at the detention center for almost a year, yet he
did not receive proper medical care until he was released, when it
was too late.149
In the United States penal system, the prisoners' reform
movement involved ever increasing prisoner challenges to prison
administrators by way of litigation starting in the 1960s with Cooper
v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) and culminating in Wolf v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 549 (1974), where the Supreme Court held that prisoners
have firmly established constitutional rights.' Shortly thereafter
145. Id.
146. National Health Experts Brief, supra note 26, at 15.
147. Carlson 446 U.S. at 25.
148. National Health Experts Brief, supra note 26, at 16.
149. Id.
150. James B. Jacobs, supra note 73, at 440-41. Justice White wrote the
Supreme Court's opinion, stating:
Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many
rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen...[b]ut though his
rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the
institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime.
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Estelle (1976) provided that the deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.' This
standard was extended by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) to
prison officials' acts or failures to act with deliberate indifference of
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.15 2 Under Farmer, the
individual "would not escape liability if evidence showed that he
merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected
to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly
suspected to exist."l 53  This statement sounds eerily similar to Dr.
Hui's acts in response to several doctors' recommendations that
Castaneda be immediately treated for cancer.
It would be unreasonable to say that because immigrant detainees
are not United States citizens, they should not be privy to the same
Constitutional rights as prisoners. This distinction would serve as an
injustice to the many refugees who eventually receive amnesty and
also to the legal immigrants who are detained erroneously.' 54 In fact,
immigrant detainees do have some constitutional rights, such as due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment and the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 5 s
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that when the
State takes a person into custody and holds him against his will, the
Constitution imposes a corresponding duty upon that State to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being, since he is
not free to act on his own behalf.156  The Constitution is violated
when officials manifest "deliberate indifference to serious medical
There is no iron curtain drawn between the constitution and the
prisons of this country. Wolff 418 U.S. at 555.
151. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
153. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836, 839.
153. Id. at 843.
154. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 26. "Some are legal United
States residents accused of offenses including misdemeanors. Others are lawful
immigrants seeking political asylum from danger in their own countries. Still
others are United States citizens who have been detained mistakenly." Id.
155. Brianna M. Mooty, Solving the Medical Crisis for Immigration
Detainees: Is the Proposed Detainee Basic Medical Care Act of 2008 the Answer?,
28 L. & INEQUALITY 223, 228-29 (2010).
156. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 24 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).
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needs." 57  However, under DIHS policy detainees should be kept
minimally healthy, enough to be deported or otherwise released."'
This policy is likely unconstitutional as it restricts medical care to
conditions that would cause deterioration of detainee's health or
uncontrolled suffering affecting his or her deportation status. It is
simply impossible to reconcile this policy with the Supreme Court's
holding that the Eighth Amendment requires treatment of immediate
health problems and prevention of future harms the detainee may
suffer from his condition.159 A reasonable policy would, at the very
least, be designed to prevent a reduction in the immigrant detainee's
life expectancy while detained, so that the detainee is released in the
same state of health as beforehand.
In Castaneda, the Supreme Court understated or ignored the
deterrent impact of Bivens liability on government agencies, which it
stated in Carlson would deter the grave mistreatment of individuals,
by exposing and labeling an agency's actions as constitutional
violations.1 60 Since PHS personnel are typically indemnified by the
Government when sued in their individual capacities under Bivens
and damage awards in these cases can be substantially larger than the
awards under the FTCA, the pressure of increased monetary
judgments and adverse publicity would have highlighted the need for
reform in a system plagued by flawed medical judgments, faulty
administrative practice, neglectful guards, ill-trained technicians,
sloppy record-keeping, lost medical files, and dangerous staff
shortages.'61
157. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (establishing the standard for violations of the
Eighth Amendment and holding a constitutional violation actionable against state
employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
158. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 26.
159. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)
(for the premise that a prisoner's claim under the Eighth Amendment could be
based on possible future harm to health as well as past harm). See McKenna v.
Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004) (offering no qualified immunity from
prisoner's claim of Eighth Amendment violation for prison officials who allegedly
denied treatment for Hepatitis C, based on the fact that the prisoner might be
released within a year); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that a desire to limit the cost of medical care may not justify failure to
address a serious medical need).
160. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 25.
161. See Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, System of Neglect: As Tighter
Immigration Policies Strain Federal Agencies, the Detainees in Their Care Often
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Although as amici for Dr. Hui, the Commissioned Officers
Association of the United States PHS ("Association") stated that
allowing Bivens actions would impede PHS's ability to recruit and
retain personnel and would destroy its ability to quickly respond to
medical emergencies, this premise is simply not true. 162 Dr. Hui and
the Association failed to identify any PHS doctors who claim they
would not have joined PHS if they had known they would be subject
to the same Bivens liability as doctors employed by other agencies.1 63
The Association's claim that there is a 13.5% pay differential
between PHS and private sector employees is speculative at best, but
even if there is a gap, PHS doctors often receive non-fiscal benefits
in addition to compensation that exceed those in the private sector.'
For example, PHS personnel are eligible for retirement benefits after
20 years of service, and they are entitled to free medical and dental
care, low cost healthcare for their families, shopping privileges at
lower-cost stores on military bases, Veterans Affairs benefits, and a
host of other valuable remunerations.165 More importantly, any gap
in compensation between public and private employment would exist
not just in PHS but in the dozens of other federal, state, and local
agencies that provide medical care to prisoners or other detainees.' 66
There is simply no basis for the Association's claim that lack of
Bivens immunity will subject the PHS to additional, intolerable
litigation burdens.' 67 Since the victim will also have a right to sue
the United States for medical malpractice under the FTCA, the
litigation burdens will be substantially the same when Bivens claims
are allowed to proceed.16 8 The parties will engage in virtually the
same discovery and they do not need counsel, as the Department of
Justice will represent their interests or pay for separate counsel in the
event of a conflict.169 Even if the government were to decide not to
Pay a Heavy Cost, Wash. Post, May 11, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Priest &
Goldstein Report].
162. National Health Experts Brief, supra note 26, at 17-18 (citing Association
Br. 5-10).
163. Id. at 19.
164. Id. at 20 (citing Association Br. 6).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 20-21.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 21.
169. Id.
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represent PHS doctors, $1 million of personal liability insurance
coverage for Bivens claims costs only $270 per year, which is a
reflection of how difficult it is to assert such claims successfully. 70
Meanwhile, private premiums for physicians range from $10,000 to
$173,000 per year depending on specialty and location.' 7 '
The only relevant difference is that Bivens claims are
substantially harder to bring than ordinary malpractice claims, as the
standard of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"
requires proof that Dr. Hui's care "constituted unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" or was "repugnant to the conscience of
mankind." 72 However, it would demean the medical profession to
suggest that the average doctor would be willing to shirk his or her
duties in a way that violates the most basic principles guiding every
physician, which is the standard for a Bivens violation. 173 Indeed,
this standard requires a failure of medical care so fundamental that
PHS would do better to avoid employing anyone providing that type
of care.1 74 Exposing PHS employees to Bivens liability would place
them in the same position as other federal employees "who perform
identical functions and are similarly subject to Bivens liability."' 75
Thus, it provides a manageable remedy that poses no danger to
federal programs and helps ensure proper administration of
government. 176 Furthermore, "[t]here is no reason to assume that
Congress intended to provide PHS with extraordinary immunity from
constitutional violations that is not enjoyed by other government
employees doing the same work." 77
V. SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS
In Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens, he wrote that "the Bill
of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the
individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative
170. Id. at 22 (citing Association Br. 6).
171. Id. at 22-23.
172. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06 (internal citations omitted).
173. National Health Experts Brief, supra note 26, at 18.
174. Id.
175. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 31.
176. Id.
177. National Health Experts Brief, supra note 26, at 24.
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majorities..." Thus, the problems with medical treatment of
immigrant detainees are unlikely to be resolved by the political
branches, precisely because of the unpopular nature of immigrants,
particularly those that are perceived as unlawful immigrants or
criminal aliens, like those in ICE detention facilities. 179 Although
Congress has requested information pertaining to these issues, thus
far, there have not been significant changes for immigrant detainees,
and in the absence of continued attention to these issues,
improvements are unlikely.'8 0  In an attempt to understand the
societal impact of the current immigrant detainee system, this Section
is divided into a discussion of how this system functions and a
portrayal of other immigrant detainees' experiences within this
system.
A. Immigrant Detainee Statistics
The SDCF is run by the Corrections Corporation of America, Inc.
("CCA"), which is the United Sates' largest for-profit correctional
services provider and overall fifth largest corrections system in the
nation, even though it was founded just over twenty-five years ago.' 8 '
CCA houses approximately 75,000 detainees and prisoners in more
than 60 facilities, 44 of which are company owned, with a total bed
capacity of more than 80,000.182 Recently, the Wall Street Journal
reported that private for-profit prison companies are preparing for a
wave of new business as the economic downturn makes it
178. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407.
179. Id. at 17-18.
180. Id. at 17-18, 20. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Ensuring Fairness
and Due Process in Immigration Proceedings 1,
http://www.abanet.org/polady/transition/2008dec-immigration.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2011).
181. The Public Record Report, supra note 30; CORRECTIONS CORPORATION
OF AMERICA, About CCA, http://www.correctionscorp.com/about/ (last visited Feb.
18, 2011).
182. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, About CCA,
http://www.correctionscorp.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). CCA employs
17,000 people and partners with all three federal corrections agencies (The federal
Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals Service and ICE, nearly half of all states, and
more than a dozen local municipalities. Id.
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increasingly difficult for federal and state governments to build and
operate their own detention centers. 183
Prior to 1996, the United States generally used detention systems
only for persons considered to be security threats of flights risks.184
However, after several 1996 statutes addressing immigration were
enacted, the number of noncitizens being detained increased rapidly,
and policy changes since 9/11 resulted in further increases. 8 5
According to the GAO, in 2006 nearly 300,000 men, women and
children were detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, tripling the number since 2001, and a significant
number of these detainees spent more than 200 days in
confinement.186 A Congressional Research Service Report indicates
that in October 2007, 65% of detainees were housed at state and local
prisons, 19% at contract facilities, 14% at ICE's own facilities, and
2% at Bureau of Prisons facilities. 87
ICE claims that approximately twenty-five percent of immigrant
detainees have chronic illnesses including hypertension, diabetes,
HIV/AIDS and other illnesses requiring ongoing treatment. 8 8
Current issues include medical staff giving inconsistent and
inadequate treatment by failing to provide medical check-ups on
arrival or within 14 days in accordance with ICE standards.189 Care
is often limited to urgent medical needs and translation services are
often not available, which likely prevents staff from administering
correct treatment.190 The quality of personnel is questionable as there
183. Id.
184. Mooty, supra note 155, at 228.
185. Id. at 230. The statutes referred to are the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) amending existing immigration laws to
address heightened concerns of terrorism, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) amending the AEDPA and adding
a provision to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requiring automatic
mandatory detention without bail for any alien convicted of an "aggravated
felony." Id. at 228-29.
186. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 25.
187. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Healthcare for
Noncitizens in Immigration Detention 1, 3 (June 27, 2008),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34556_20080627.pdf (Francisco Castaneda is
mentioned on page 2).
188. Mooty, supra note 155, at 231-32.
189. Id. at 232-33.
190. Id. at 233.
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are documented instances of doctors and nurses laughing at detainees
for "faking" illnesses later proven to be legitimate and life-
threatening, meanwhile ICE's medical care standards are non-binding
and routinely ignored.191
Since all those in custody are completely dependent on
governmental officers for access to necessary medical care, those
with serious medical needs are at grave risk should ICE employees
fail to provide appropriate treatment.192 Shortly before his death,
Castaneda himself testified in front of the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security, and International Law about being denied adequate medical
care, despite the fact that it was needed to save his life.193
Other issues with the administration of the immigration detention
system include a lack of transparency and oversight.194 In particular,
medical records are often inaccessible to the detainee and gaining
access may require detainees or their families to hire an attorney.195
One family waited many months to receive the medical records of a
relative who had died under questionable circumstances while in
immigration detention, and the report ended up containing thirty-one
pages of redacted information for "privacy."196 With regard to
oversight, a GAO report revealed that ICE's current inspection
system is deeply flawed, as ICE often fails to meet even the low
standard of facility inspection once per year.'97 External actors, such
191. Id.
192. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 26. See Problems with ICE
Immigration, Detention, and Removal Procedures, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 110-80, at 118-19
(Feb. 13, 2008), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/40742.PDF
[hereinafter Problems with ICE Hearing].
193. Id. See Presentation on Medical Care and Deaths in ICE Custody,
Problems with ICE Immigration, Detention, and Removal: Immigration Detainee
Medical Care, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (October 4, 2007) (Testimony of Francisco
Castaneda), http://www.aclu.org/files/images/assetuploadfile84 1_32062.pdf
[hereinafter October 4, 2007 Hearing].
194. Mooty, supra note 155, at 235-36.
195. Id. at 236.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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as the Red Cross, United Nations or other governmental or non-
governmental agencies have not bothered to investigate the
immigrant detainee system. 98
The executive branch has responded to calls for change, as the
Obama Administration's newly appointed ICE supervisor John
Morton has pledged to turn immigration detention into a "truly civil
detention system." 99 Still, immigration experts claim that they have
seen virtually nothing of the proposed reforms, which should include
legally binding standards that govern basic levels of care and
conditions inside immigration detention facilities, because simply
having the government consolidate its oversight is not enough to hold
facilities accountable.200
The ACLU has suggested that Congress strengthen the statutory
right to appointed counsel for all those facing removal from the
United States, mandate that no detainee be housed in a facility that
does not comply with detention standards, and require all
immigration detainee deaths be publicly reported from ICE to
Congress on a regular basis. 201 Recommendations for ICE oversight
of the immigrant detention system include: 1) regulatory codification
of detention standards in line with internationally recognized human
rights principles, 2) development of non-penal alternatives to
detention, 3) provision of constitutionally adequate custody review
before an immigration judge or impartial adjudicator, and 4) transfer
of complete medical records when detainees are moved to allow for
prompt administration of needed treatment.202
B. Other Immigrant Detainees'Experiences
and Press Involvement
The ACLU has written that Castaneda's plight, although extreme,
was by no means an isolated case, listing Martin Hernandez-
Banderas, Winston Carcamo, and Jose Arias Forero as other ICE
detainees mistreated by Dr. Hui at the SDCF.203 In Hernandez-
198. Id.
199. The Public Record Report, supra note 30.
200. Id.
201. Problems with ICE Hearing, supra note 192, at 119.
202. Id.
203. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 21-22.
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Banderas v. United States, the Complaint alleged that Dr. Hui despite
having actual knowledge that he was a newly diagnosed diabetic, his
blood sugars were abnormally high and uncontrolled by insulin, he
could no longer walk and was confined to a wheelchair, and his leg
was deteriorating and dying due to a serious skin condition known as
cellulitis, intentionally misrepresented his condition in medical
records in order to downplay its seriousness and protect herself from
liability. 204 As a result he was ultimately taken to an offsite hospital,
where he remained for a month and suffered permanent physical
deformity and impairment, including a recommendation to amputate
his leg due to severe tissue death.205 A Washington Post
investigation revealed that an internal review had concluded that
DIHS medical personnel did not appreciate the severity of
Hernandez-Banderas' diabetic foot wounds, did not properly treat
them, and did not bring in a qualified person to evaluate the
problem. 206
In another instance, detainee Carcamo suffered an injury
requiring removal of his right eye, and at the time of the surgery, he
was told he needed a prosthetic eye implant to preserve the physical
integrity of the eye socket and prevent the spread of infection. After
being detained at the SDCF, Carcamo claimed his family would pay
for the procedure, and still the SDCF delayed it for more than six
months, supposedly because the injury "didn't happen here" and
DIHS policy did not cover "elective or pre-existing conditions." 207
By the time the procedure finally occurred, it caused Carcamo severe
pain, since in the meantime, his bones had shifted and the eye socket
had begun to close. 20 8
Despite the fact that Forero suffered a serious shoulder injury and
complained of severe pain in his right arm and shoulder, medical
personnel at the SDCF told him there was nothing wrong and that he
was faking the pain, though when he finally received an MRI it
revealed a complete tear of his right rotator cuff.209 After his arrival,
he did not receive surgery for eight months, and the SDCF ignored
204. Id. at 22-23 (citing Hernandez-Banderas Compl. 18-21, 38-39, 54, 59).
205. Id. at 23 (citing Hernandez-Banderas Compl. 1, 59).
206. Id. (citing Priest & Goldstein Report, supra note 161).
207. Id. at 23-24 (citing Woods Compl. 91-94).
208. Id. at 24.
209. Id. (citing Woods Compl. 80-83).
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the doctor's orders for him to receive follow-up care and physical
therapy.210 After a complete re-injury from officer use of excessive
force, he did not receive a subsequent MRI for four months.21'
Victoria Arellano, who suffered from advanced AIDS, died while
in custody at another facility, and a summary of her death concluded
that PHS staff at all levels failed to recognize symptoms of
meningitis, failed to rule out various infections, delayed necessary
lab work pursuant to a facility policy described as "dangerous" and
ultimately provided her with incorrect medication. 2 12
While detained at ICE, Boubacar Bah suffered a skull fracture
and intracranial bleeding and was taken to the health unit where PHS
personnel misdiagnosed his behavior as a disciplinary matter,
restrained him, and approved his placement in a segregation cell.213
Over a number of hours, guards repeatedly requested medical
attention for Bah as he began foaming at the mouth, lost
consciousness, and became unresponsive, but the guards received no
response and Bah died after undergoing emergency surgery.2 14
Further evidence indicates that the officials engaged in a cover-up
in order to hide Bah's mistreatment, as a recent New York Times
investigation showed that ICE told a reporter she could learn nothing
about the Bah case from government authorities, when in fact records
proved that while he lay in a coma after emergency surgery, ten
agency managers conferred at length about sending Bah back to
Africa to avoid embarrassing publicity and the high costs of long-
term care at $10,000 per month.215 Ultimately, officials decided to
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 28-29. See October 4, 2007
Hearing, supra note 193, at 1, 54; Priest & Goldstein Report, supra note 161.
213. Id. at 29. See Will Coley, What Really Happened to Boubacar Bah, N.Y.
TIMES VIDEO (Jan. 9, 2010; 10:56 PM),
http://detentionwatchnetwork.wordpress.com/2010/01/09/ny-times-video-what-
really-happened-to-boubacar-bah/.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 30-31. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Obscured Truth Of Migrant
Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at Al [hereinafter Bernstein January 2010
Report]. The same report indicated that another detainee's medical charge was
altered by health personnel after his death to indicate that he had been given pain
medication not actually administered. Id.
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pursue a "humanitarian release" to cousins in New York, despite the
family's protest that they had no way to care for him.2 16
In fact, the evidence assembled by Congress, as well as material
collected through Freedom of Information Act requests and by the
New York Times, Washington Post, CBS News, and other
independent media reveal tragedy after tragedy in which detainees
have been denied safe and humane medical care.217 A Washington
Post report concluded that detainees "are locked in a world of slow
care, poor care, and no care, with panic and cover-ups among
employees watching it happen." 218 The report went on to expose "a
hidden world of flawed medical judgment, faulty administrative
practices, neglectful guards, ill-trained technicians, sloppy record-
keeping, lost medical files and dangerous staff shortages."219
The GAO supports this premise, as Department of Homeland
Security inspections have demonstrated noncompliance with medical
standards in facilities where deaths occurred.220 In particular, ICE
216. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 21-22. See Bernstein January 2010 Report,
supra note 215. Just a few days prior to the planned release, he died. Id.
217. Id. at 26-27. See Nina Bernstein, Hurdles Shown in Detention Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009; 60 MINUTES, Detention in America,
http://cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/09/60minutes/main4083279.shtml; Amy
Goldstein & Dana Priest, In Custody, In Pain: Beset by Medical Problems as She
Fights Deportation, A U.S. Resident Struggles to Get the Treatment She Needs,
WASH. POST, May 12, 2008, at Al; Amy Goldstein & Dana Priest, Suicides Point
to Gaps in Treatment Errors in Psychiatric Diagnoses and Drugs Plague Strained
Immigration System, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at Al; Amy Goldstein & Dana
Priest, Some Detainees Are Drugged for Deportation: Immigrants Sedated Without
Medical Reason, WASH. POST, May 14, 2008, at Al; Bob Egelko, U.S. Admits
Negligence in Detainee's Death, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 2008, at B-3; Amanda
Milkovits and Karen Lee Ziner, Immigrant Died of Drug Combination,
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, (Sept. 20, 2007, 2:18 PM),
http://www.projo.com/news/content/immigrant death_09-20-
07 E676L34.3425f5d.html. See also ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, Panel
on Health Care for Immigration Detainees: What Should Be the Standard?,
http://www.abanow.org/2009/02/health-care-for-immigration-detainees-what-
should-be-the-standard/?audio (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
218. Id. at 27 (quoting Priest & Goldstein, supra note 161).
219. Id.
220. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 27-28. See U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-308R, DHS: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
AND RESOURCES FOR PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO IMMIGRATION DETAINEES (Feb.
23, 2009) (Letter from Alicia P. Cackley, Dir. of Health Care, to H. & S.
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figures show that 107 persons have died since October 2003, though
reports indicate that the agency undercounts the number of detention
deaths and discharges other detainees shortly before they die,221 as in
Castaneda's case where his detention was abruptly ended when PHS
employees realized that they might be held liable for refusing to
provide him with even minimally adequate medical care. A
subsequent report by the Washington Post concluded that actions or
omissions by medical staff members may have contributed to at least
thirty of the 107 detainee deaths.222
These cases and others demonstrate that the deliberate
indifference and suffering that Castaneda endured was not an isolated
problem, and these allegations go far beyond the sort of negligent
malpractice that the FTCA intended to compensate.223 Without a
Bivens remedy, victims and their families now have no cause of
action available in order to address such cruel and unusual
conduct.224 Bivens liability for constitutional violations would have
generated pressure from within DIHS to reform policies encouraging
the excessive restriction of immigrant detainee medical care and
eventually would have spurred the appropriate government officials
to address the matter.225
VI. CONCLUSION
While employees of the federal government police and prison
system may be found individually liable for violations of the Federal
Constitution and state employees are similarly liable for violations of
the Federal Constitution under § 1983, there no longer exist any
Subcomm. on Homeland Security), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09308r.pdf;
June 4, 2008 Hearing, supra note 29, at 34-43; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, OIG, ICE POLICIES RELATED TO DETAINEE DEATHS AND THE
OVERSIGHT OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (June 2008),
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-52_JunO8.pdf
221. Id. at 28. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Say Fatalities OfDetainees Were
Missed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at Al0 (ICE revealed that it had omitted ten
in-custody deaths from an official list produced to Congress and the public);
Bernstein January 2010 Report, supra note 215.
222. Id. See Priest & Goldstein, supra note 161.
223. Id. at 24-25.
224. Id. at 25.
225. Id.
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private rights of action against individual PHS employees for
constitutional violations. 226
The Castaneda decision further provides that state affiliated, for-
profit CCA facilities now have the benefit of sovereign immunity and
will not be held liable for violations of our Constitution, so long as
they are staffed by PHS employees. One problem with this psudo-
private immigrant detainee system is that these companies may not
be held accountable in the same way that the government is held
responsible should it fail to behave ethically. For instance, members
of Congress and the President are regularly voted in and out of office,
and although they are appointed, high-level employees at federal,
state, and local agencies are subject to political pressure.227
Back in 1970, Congress's intent in passing § 233(a) was to
increase funds available to those who were not in a position to
provide for their own healthcare needs, since at the time medical
malpractice insurance far exceeded claims made against government
agencies providing healthcare to individuals. 228  Unfortunately, the
PHSA is now being used to prevent detainees from seeking justice
against individuals who violated their constitutional rights by
providing substandard and reckless medical care,229 which is quite
ironic.
The Washington Post documented that Dr. Hui in 2008 sent a
memo to DIHS medical director Timothy Shack claiming her
colleagues were worried they might be sued because of the
226. Representatives Brief, supra note 40, at 31. Considering that state
officials are held accountable for their constitutional violations under § 1983, "the
constitutional design would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at
least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional
transgression." Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1298. Thus, there
should be uniform rules governing liability of federal officials for violations of
citizens' constitutional rights, and these rights should not be left to the vagaries of
the laws of the several states. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1298.
227. Voting is the people's solution when they disapprove of acts or policies
put forth by government employees.
228. Griffith, supra note 58, at 34.
229. Amici indicate that the cost of malpractice insurance, even individual
liability insurance covering both medical malpractice and Bivens constitutional
violations, would amount to about $300 per year. National Health Experts Brief,
supra note 26, at 22. If the federal government decided to cover this cost for its
PHS physicians, it would be interesting to know if it would even come close to the
amount of money spend defending Dr. Hui in this action alone.
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substandard care they were giving detainees, as the agency's mission
of keeping the detainee medically ready for deportation often
conflicts with the standards of care in the wider medical
community.230 Thus, the Supreme Court's provision of sovereign
immunity to individual PHS physician helps to legitimize these
knowingly wrongful acts.231
On the other hand, if Dr. Hui was a private sector employee, she
would likely have ceased being a physician a long time ago.
Although it is not likely to occur, total privatization of the immigrant
detention system would decrease the costs of the United States
government defending doctors such as Dr. Hui, who has been sued
multiple times by immigrant detainees and their families for
providing medical care so grossly negligent, it rises to the level of a
constitutional violation.232
At the very least, an economic analysis should be conducted to
determine the cost of public versus private liability in the context of
Bivens constitutional claims, as it seems both ethical and responsible
to force these costs on the individual at fault and not on Untied States
taxpayers. Protecting Dr. Hui under the doctrine of absolute
immunity without exposing her to the individual risk of medical
malpractice or Bivens constitutional claims allows her to practice
medicine in any way she so chooses. As a result, neither she nor any
other PHS physician will be held accountable for their frequent
failures to uphold the principle that their utmost duty should be to
their patients.
230. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 26 (citing Priest & Goldstein, supra note
161).
231. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM.
BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521 (1977) (pointing out that "the abuse of official
power is an especially serious evil.. .the potential impact of government on the
lives of individuals is unique because of its capacity to employ legitimized
violence.")
232. ACLU Brief, supra note 2, at 21-22.
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